Agentic Red Teaming

Zenjin Agentic Red Teaming

Find weaknesses before attackers do.

Simulate real-world attacks against your AI agents to uncover security vulnerabilities, unsafe behaviors, and data exposure risks. Get actionable findings and evidence to strengthen your defenses.

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At a glance

  • Orchestrator

    Sets the campaign

  • Attacker

    Probes the agent

  • Judge

    Scores what landed

  • Evidence

    Filed, not a deck

A campaign you can watch, then file

Simulate real-world attacks against your AI agents to uncover security vulnerabilities, unsafe behaviors, and data exposure risks. Get actionable findings and evidence to strengthen your defenses.

Orchestrator, attacker, judge

Three roles, one workflow, not a pile of prompts in a notebook.

Continuous testing

Scheduled and on-demand campaigns against production-shaped targets.

Findings review

Triage, severity, and owners instead of a dumped JSON report.

Evidence, not theater

Findings write into compliance. That is the point of a control layer.

Dark specimen with a hairline fracture and a faint targeting ring
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Today vs Zenjin

A finding in a deck is not a campaign.

Today

Manual, periodic, trapped in a deck.

Testing is manual, periodic, and trapped in slide decks. Nothing regresses the last jailbreak after the next model bump.

  • Manual
  • Periodic
  • Slide deck
  • Stale
Spent stone tablets labeled Pentest PDF, Slide deck, Jailbreak, and Notebook

With Zenjin

A campaign you can watch, then file.

Continuous workflows with an orchestrator, attacker, and judge. Findings review and compliance mapping in the same system.

  • Orchestrated
  • Judged
  • Filed
  • Continuous
Orchestrator, Attacker, and Judge in a rose circuit with a finding filed

How a campaign runs

From a named target to a finding that still holds after the next bump.

  1. 01

    Scope the target

    Point the workflow at a model, agent, or MCP in inventory.

    Model, Agent, and MCP in inventory, with checkout.agent ringed as the target

  2. 02

    Run attacker and judge

    Automated campaigns: injection, tool misuse, exfil, system-prompt exposure.

    Attacker probing a target with injection, tool misuse, and exfil while a judge watches

  3. 03

    Review findings

    Severity, reproduction, and owners, then map into controls.

    Finding RT-1841 with severity, owner, and control on stacked tablets

  4. 04

    Keep it continuous

    Cadence tests so the last fix still holds after the next prompt or model change.

    A loop of Run, Fix, Model bump, and Run again around a cracked rose core

Who it is for

  • AppSec
  • Red team
  • AI security
  • GRC

FAQ

  • Those are scanners or engagements. Zenjin agentic red teaming is a product workflow whose output is inventory-aware findings that become audit evidence.

  • Both. Tool misuse and MCP paths are first-class, not an afterthought on a chat completion.

  • This is the continuous automated layer. Human engagements still matter for novel chains; we keep the known attacks from regressing.

  • Attacker agents run against your agents, with an orchestrator setting the campaign and a judge scoring whether a leak, injection, or tool misuse actually landed.

  • Yes. Severity, reproduction, and owners write into the same evidence trail as Data Security Posture Management and evals.

  • Prompt injection, tool misuse, exfiltration, and system-prompt exposure, against models, agents, and MCP targets already in inventory.

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