Agentic Identity

Zenjin Agentic Identity

Every agent has an identity, a graph, and a policy.

Zenjin Agentic Identity gives every agent an identity, a trust graph, and policy, so you can answer who spawned it, what it can do, and who approved it.

At a glance

  • Registry

    Named, owned agents

  • Graph

    Spawn and authority

  • Policy

    What it may call

  • Approvals

    When it should wait

Who spawned it, and who said yes

Agents inherit a human key until someone asks. Agentic Identity binds a registry, a trust graph, policy, live violations, and an approval path.

Registry

Every agent is named, owned, and tied to an identity provider.

Trust graph

Spawn relationships and authority, not a flat list of bots.

Policy rules

What an agent may call, spawn, or spend.

Live runs and approvals

Violations surface in the moment; approvals are part of the product.

Two dark objects bound by a thin gold filament in black space

Today vs Zenjin

A shared key is not an identity.

Today

Agents hiding behind a human key.

Agents inherit a human’s API key or a shared service account. When a sub-agent appears, nobody can say who authorized it.

  • API key
  • Shared account
  • Sub-agent
  • Unauthorized
A human API key and a shared-account key with agent spheres as the handles

With Zenjin

Registry, graph, policy, and a human sign-off.

Tenant IdP defaults, a registry, a trust graph, policy rules, live runs, violations, and an approval path.

  • Bound
  • Graphed
  • Policy
  • Approved
A bound registry sphere wired to Graph, Policy, and Approved nodes

Bind, graph, approve

Bind the agent, draw the spawn graph, approve what should not auto-allow.

  1. 01

    Bind identity

    Tenant IdP defaults and an agent registry. Agents are identities, not strings in a config.

    An agent receiving a gold ring from an IdP seal
  2. 02

    Draw the graph

    See spawn chains, tools, and who sits above whom.

    A parent agent with two spawn nodes on the diagonals
  3. 03

    Enforce and approve

    Policy rules, live-run violations, and human approval when the system should not auto-allow.

    An approval seal at the base of an identity artifact

Who it is for

  • IAM
  • CISO
  • Platform
  • GRC

FAQ

  • SSO is the floor. The product is registry, trust graph, policy, live violations, and approvals: identity that answers who authorized that.

  • The graph records the spawn. Policy decides if it is allowed. If not, it becomes a violation or an approval, not a surprise in production.

  • A run is checked against identity and policy as it happens. Unused tools stay on the graph as unused. Approvals fire when the system should not auto-allow.

  • Tenant IdP defaults bind agents to the directory you already run. Agents are identities, not strings in a config.

  • Spawn relationships, tools, and authority: who sits above whom, and which keys or tools a run actually used.

  • Policy decides. Some violations are recorded for review. Some require human approval before the next call.